

Inter-procedural buffer overflows detection in C/C++ source code via static analysis

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


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Accessing (reading or writing) the buffer with value that exceeds its bounds.

- may lead to program fall, incorrect operation of the program, security vulnerability;
- for the last ten years remains one of the most common source of vulnerability.



Detecting buffer overflow vulnerabilities by analyzing code in general is an undecidable problem.

The halting problem can be trivially reduced to the buffer overflow detection problem.

Analyzer use cases define the treshold between:

- recall,
- scalability,
- resource consumption,
- speed,
- FP rate.

Developing buffer overflow detector within **SVACE** .

Requirements

- high scalability,
full **Android** analysis in 5 hours (all detectors),
- high True Positive rate (50% – 70%),
- *path-sensitivity*,
- *inter-procedural detection*,
- warning message with detailed trace.

Limitatons

- Buffers on stack or on static memory with compile-time known size only.

Approach based on critical edge detection


A BOF warning is fired if CFG of a function contains an edge, for which every path containing this edge always has out of bounds buffer access.

Advantages

- High TP rate.
This BOF defect definition is based on the assumption that programmers do not write unreachable code, which is satisfied for the vast majority of cases.
- Efficient detection algorithm.


Flaw

- Missing real defects.
Not all BOF errors satisfy this criteria.



Out of bounds access happens if `cond1 && cond1` is satisfiable.

- No critical edge.
- Satisfiability of conjunctions of path conditions must be checked to report such kind of an error.



```
1 #define S 10
2 int buf[S];
```

```
3 void foo(int idx) {
4     buf[idx]++;
5 }
```

```
6 int bar(int a, int b) {
7     if (a >= S-1) {
8         // ...
9     }
10    if (b)
11        a++;
12    return buf[a];
13 }
```

BOF if $\text{idx} \geq S$

BOF if $a \geq S - 1 \ \&\& \ (b)$

```
1 #define S 10
2 int buf[S];
```

```
3 void foo(int idx) {
4     buf[idx]++;
5 }
```

```
6 int bar(int a, int b) {
7     if (a >= S-1) { //true
8         // ...
9     }
10    if (b) //true
11        a++;
12    return buf[a];
13 }
```

BOF if $idx \geq S$
For the single path BOF
depends on idx

BOF if $a \geq S - 1 \ \&\& \ (b)$
The path contains BOF regardless
input values


```
1 #define S 10
2 int buf[S];
```

```
3 void foo(int idx) {
4     buf[idx]++; //OK
5 }
```

```
6 int bar(int a, int b) {
7     if (a >= S-1) { //true
8         // ...
9     }
10    if (b) //true
11        a++;
12    return buf[a]; //BOF here
13 }
```

BOF if $idx \geq S$
For the single path BOF
depends on idx

BOF if $a \geq S - 1 \ \&\& \ (b)$
The path contains BOF regardless
input values

A function is said to have a BOF defect if it's CFG contains a path, for which the following hold

- it contains an access to the buffer of size S with index i ,
- for each set of input values either this path is infeasible or $i \notin [0, S-1]$,
- it is feasible for at least one set of input values*.

*We don't have any information about possible sets of input values according to the precondition. Hence, in case where this faulty path is forbidden by the precondition we will have a FP-warning.

SVACE core is responsible for base analyses, such as building CFG, unreachable code detection, detecting functions terminating program, etc.

SVACE core performs value numbering which produces a set of value identifiers (VId).

Each detector can use results of core analyses and it operates by mapping some properties to value identifiers ($v \in VId$) at every program point $q \in Instr$. These mappings are known as *attributes*.

$$Attr : VId \times Instr \rightarrow AttrVal$$

SVACE core performs symbolic execution with state merging. It notifies all detectors about all program events. To develop a checker one should specify handlers for essential events.

During symbolic execution **SVACE** computes necessary reachability conditions for all program points as formulas on value identifiers.

$$ReachCond : Instr \rightarrow Cond$$

Suppose for particular $q \in Instr$ and $v \in VId$ and arbitrary $x \in VId$ we have formula $NotLess(q, v, x)$.

For arbitrary x , $NotLess(q, v, x)$ is a sufficient condition for the fact that if execution reached q , then it went along a path, on which **always** (regardless function input values) $v \geq x$.

Similarly for $NotGreater(q, v, x)$.

Then, for the point $ac \in Instr$, where buffer of size S is accessed by $i \in VId$, a sufficient condition of overflow (according to the definition) is satisfiability of

$$ReachCond(q) \wedge (NotLess(ac, i, v_s) \vee NotGreater(ac, i, v_{-1})),$$

where v_s and v_{-1} are value identifiers for constants S and -1 respectively.

Why do we need such complex condition?

```

1 #define S 10
2 int buf[S];
3 int foo(int a,
4         int c)
5 {
6     int idx;
7     if (c > 7)
8         idx = 10;
9     else
10        idx = a;
11    if (c < 15)
12        return buf[idx];
13    return a;
14 }

```

$$\text{NotLess}(p_{12}, idx, x) = (c > 7) \wedge (10 \geq x)$$

$$\text{NotGreater}(p_{12}, idx, x) = (c > 7) \wedge (10 \leq x)$$

$$\text{ReachCond}(p_{12}) = (c < 15) \wedge$$

$$((c > 7 \wedge (idx = 10)) \vee (c \leq 7 \wedge (idx = a)))$$

$$\text{BOF_Cond} = (c < 15) \wedge (c > 7)$$

$$\wedge (idx = 10) \wedge (10 \geq S)$$

Satisfiable ($a = 0, c = 8, idx = 10$)

\Rightarrow fire warning! (faulty path 6-7-8-11-12)

Just $idx \geq S$ will not work because of the unknown precondition.

Eg precondition is ($a \leq 9$), but as long as we don't know it, we will report warning for $a = 42, c = 3, idx = 42$.

Calculating *NotLess* and *NotGreater* formulas

Calculating these formulas for constants is trivial.

$$\text{Eg. } \quad \text{NotLess}(q, c, x) = (c \geq x)$$

If you know these formulas for a and b you can calculate formulas for

- values that were compared to a in some dominant vertex (eg. for t if in current point holds $t > a$),
- the result of an arithmetic operation $r = a \diamond b$,
- join value of a and b in the merged state (eg. $c = \text{cond} ? a : b$),
- ...

Three points on the program form BOF:

- index definition,
- buffer definition,
- access instruction.

All three points can belong to the different functions, so the warning should be reported in the closest common ancestor (in cycle-free callgraph).

SVACE uses function summaries to perform interprocedural analysis. All functions are analyzed from bottom to top in the callgraph and results of the callee analysis are used in the caller.

Inter-procedural calculation of *NotLess* and *NotGreater* formulas

```
1 #define S 10
2 int buf[S];
3 int foo(int a,
4         int c)
5 {
6     int idx;
7     if (c > 7)
8         idx = 10;
9     else
10        idx = a;
11    if (c < 15)
12        return buf[idx];
13    return a;
14 }
```

- Propagating whole formula for variables which are present in caller to the caller context when applying the summary.
- Creating stubs for formal argument while calculating formula. They will be replaced with formula for actual argument in caller context if it has one.

$$r = \text{foo}(k, c);$$
$$\text{NotLess}(k) = P$$
$$\text{NotLess}(r) = (c \geq 15) \wedge (r = k) \wedge P$$

Conditional facts of buffer access inside a function

```
1 #define S 10
2 int buf[S];
3 int foo(int a,
4         int c)
5 {
6     int idx;
7     if (c > 7)
8         idx = 10;
9     else
10        idx = a;
11    if (c < 15)
12        return buf[idx];
13    return a;
14 }
```

- access to the buffer with known size,
access to buffer of size: S
with index: a
if (c <= 7) && (c < 15)
- access to the buffer, passed as an argument.

BUFFER_OVERFLOW.EX – main checker.

BUFFER_OVERFLOW.LIB.EX – uncorrect use of libcalls.

OVERFLOW_AFTER_CHECK.EX – BOF in cycle.

Evaluation results on Android 5.0.2

Warning type	Count	TP, %
BUFFER_OVERFLOW.EX	221	62
BUFFER_OVERFLOW.LIB.EX	64	64
OVERFLOW_AFTER_CHECK.EX	66	67