Methodology for Comparing and Analyzing the Security of Interrupt-Handling Subsystems in Operating-System Kernels and Their Resilience to Interrupt Storms
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Methodology for Comparing and Analyzing the Security of Interrupt-Handling Subsystems in Operating-System Kernels and Their Resilience to Interrupt Storms
Abstract
This paper proposes a methodology for comparing operating systems (OSs) with respect to their resilience to interrupt storms–high-rate streams of hardware events in which interrupt handling displaces the application workload and may result in a denial-of-service (DoS) condition. The methodology combines a qualitative assessment of protection mechanisms with a quantitative computational experiment. The evaluation criteria include interrupt-source masking, interrupt coalescing (combining multiple events into a single delivery), adaptive switching to polling, management of message-signaled interrupts, interrupt affinity, kernel preemptibility, and limits on the processor time consumed by handlers. The experimental environment is based on the QEMU emulator, a virtual interrupt-generator device, and a Tiny Code Generator (TCG) plugin that performs statistical profiling of kernel and user-space execution without modifying the guest OS. The proposed approach makes it possible to relate architectural protection mechanisms to the measured reduction in the share of processor time available to the application workload.
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Edition
Proceedings of the Institute for System Programming, vol. 38, issue 4, part 2, 2026, pp. 109-122
ISSN 2220-6426 (Online), ISSN 2079-8156 (Print).
DOI: 10.15514/ISPRAS-2026-38(4)-21
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Full text of the paper in pdf (in Russian)
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